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APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(1) gives this court jurisdiction. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The question of law certified by the United States Bankruptcy Court, District of 
Utah is: Whether funds transferred directly from one exempt account, as 
described in Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5(l)(a)(x), to another exempt account within 
one year before a debtor files bankruptcy constitute "amounts contributed" within 
the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5(l)(b)(ii)? 
a. Standard of review: "Matters of statutory interpretation present questions of 
law which we review for correctness, according no particular deference to 
the trial court's interpretation."1 
b. Citation to the record: Objection to Exemption and Notice of Hearing, 
March 13, 2003.2 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5(l)(a)(x) provides: 
(l)(a) An individual is entitled to exemption of the following 
property: 
1
 State v. Yanez, 441 Utah Adv. Rep. 14,42 P.3d 1248 (Utah App.2002)(quoting 
State v. Lindsay, 2000 UT App 379, HI 4, 18 P.3d 504, cert denied, 53 P.3d l(Utah 
2002)). 
2Stephen W. Rupp, Trustee objected to the debtor, Ronald Kent Kunz' claimed 
exemption of the IRA account under §78-23-5(l)(a)(x) because under section 78-23-
5(l)(b)(ii) "amounts contributed or benefits accrued by or on behalf of the debtor 
within one year before the debtor files for bankruptcy" are not exempt. 
6 
(x) except as provided in Subsection (l)(b), any money or 
other assets held for or payable to the individual as a 
participant or beneficiary from or an interest of the 
individual as a participant or beneficiary in a retirement plan 
or arrangement that is described in Section 401(a), 401(h), 
401(k), 403(a), 403(b), 408, 408A, 409, 414(d), or 414(e) 
of the United States Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as 
amended; and 
Utah Code Annotated §78-23-5(1 )(b)(ii) provides: 
(l)(b) The exemption granted by Subsection (l)(a)(x) does 
not apply to: 
(ii) amounts contributed or benefits accrued by or on behalf 
of a debtor within one year before the debtor files for 
bankruptcy. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE & FACTS 
Nature of the case: The underlying case involves a debtor, Ronald Kent Kunz, 
who transferred or rolled-over IRA funds from one IRA account to a new IRA account 
within 1 year prior to filing a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. 
Course of Proceedings: The debtor, Ronald Kent Kunz, filed a chapter 7 
bankruptcy petition on November 27, 2002. On the debtor's statements and schedules, 
schedule B, paragraph 11, page 15, the debtor listed an interest in an IRA in the 
amount of $22,826.00. On schedule C of the debtor's statements and schedules, the 
debtor claimed the IRA as exempt from property of the estate pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated section u78-23-5(l)(a)(x), 78-23-(6)(c) and Rule 64D 11 U.S.C. 541." On 
March 13, 2002, Stephen W. Rupp, Trustee, objected to the claimed exemption of the 
7 
IRA account.3 On April 24, 2003 the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District 
of Utah took the "Objection to Exemption" question under advisement.4 On June 10, 
2003 the Bankruptcy Court certified the above question of unsettled law to the Supreme 
Court of the State of Utah. 
Disposition below: The Bankruptcy Court certified a question of unsettled law to 
the Supreme Court of the State of Utah. 
Statement of the facts: Debtor, Ronald Kent Kunz, transferred or rolled-over 
IRA funds from one IRA account to a new IRA account at Wachovia Securities within 
1 year prior to filing a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. Mr. Kunz participated in an 
individual retirement account at Merrill Lynch, Account No. 260-84S84. In August of 
2002, roughly 3 months prior to the bankruptcy petition date, IRA funds in the amount 
of $20,784.19 were transferred from the Merrill Lynch IRA account into a Wachovia 
Securities IRA account. Kunz argues the IRA Funds are exempt pursuant to 78-23-
5(l)(a)(x). The Trustee objected to Kunz's claimed exemption arguing that the IRA 
Funds lost their exemption under section 78-23-5(l)(b)(ii) because the transfer or 
rollover of the funds within one year of the bankruptcy petition is a contribution under 
that subsection. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The exemption claimed by the debtor does not apply to contributions or 
3See "Objection to Exemption and Notice of Hearing" ECF docket #18. 
4See Minute entry dated April 24, 2003 on the bankruptcy docket. 
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"amounts contributed" to an IRA account made one year prior to the filing of a 
bankruptcy petition. The transfer or rollover of the funds by the debtor within one year 
prior to filing his bankruptcy petition is a contribution. Besides the ordinary definition 
of contribution, the term contribution is also a term of art. In section 78-23-5(1 )(b) the 
term is used broadly without limitation. Industry standards, plans and applicable 
federal statutes indicate that a rollover is a type of contribution. In addition, the United 
States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah, in interpreting the meaning of 
"amounts contributed" as found in Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5-(l)(b)(ii), the very 
statute at issue in this case, stated that "if the Utah legislature intended to differentiate 
between various types of contributions, it would have done so by express reference to 
their definitions within the Internal Revenue Code. . . Therefore, 'amounts contributed' 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5-(l)(b)(ii) includes, but is not limited to, those 
amounts rolled over from ERISA-qualified plans to an IRA Annuity."5 Given the plain 
meaning of "amounts contributed" as used in § 78-23-5-(l)(b)(ii), industry standards, 
plans and caselaw interpreting "amounts contributed" to include amounts rolled over, 
the rollover by the debtor in this case is a contribution. 
ARGUMENT 
1. The facts of the case should be limited to the factual findings of the United 
Stated Bankruptcy Court. 
5
 In re Hong, 2002 WL 1465737 (Bankr.D.Utah 2002); The In re Hong 
memorandum decision and order is attached to this brief in the Addendum. 
9 
When addressing a certified question from a federal court, the Utah Supreme 
Court does not "refind the facts."6 The Utah Supreme Court noted in Hansen v. Sea 
Ray Boats, Inc.1 that where the federal court has already made findings of fact, 
additional facts presented to the Supreme Court will not be considered.8 Where no 
technical finding of facts has been made by the Federal Court, "[t]he pertinent facts are 
extracted from the order of certification." Thus, the pertinent facts in this case, as 
outlined by the bankruptcy court, are limited to those facts set out in the Joint Order 
Certifying Question to Utah State Supreme Court. 
2. A rollover is a contribution under the plain meaning of "amounts 
contributed." 
The Supreme Court of Utah has consistently relied on the plain meaning of 
statutory language unless the statutory language is ambiguous.9 The Utah Exemptions 
Act (U.C.A. 78-23-1 et seq.) does not define the terms "contribution" or "amounts 
contributed." Lacking a definition "[t]here is a presumption that the legislature 
intended to use the actual words it utilizes in the statute, which in turn . . . are intended 
6Burkholz v. Joyce, 349 Utah Adv. Rep 57, 972 P.2d 1235, 1236, (Utah 1998). 
7830 P.2d 236, 239 (Utah 1992). 
'Hansen v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc., 830 P.2d 236, 239 (Utah 1992). 
9
 See State v. Bluff, 452 Utah Adv. Rep. 13, 52 P.3d 1210, 1221 (Utah 2002); State 
v. Burns, 398 Utah Adv. Rep. 32, 4 P.3d 795, 799-800 (Utah 2000); Evans v. State 346 
Utah Adv.Rep. 3, 963 P.2d 177 (Utah 1998). 
10 
to be utilized in the ordinary and common meaning."10 The best evidence of legislative 
intent "is the plain language of the act."11 The language of the act in this statute is 
unambiguous; The exemption of section 78-23-5(b)(ii) does not apply to any "amounts 
contributed . . . within one year before the debtor files for bankruptcy." The plain 
meaning of "amounts contributed" includes any funds deposited into a retirement 
account. 
Black's Law Dictionary does not define "amounts contributed" nor does it give 
an applicable definition of "contribution" either under the definition of "contribution or 
under the definition of "individual retirement account." The Merriam-Webster 
Dictionary defines "contribute" as "to give a part to a common fund or store." In this 
case, through the rollover, the debtor gave "a part to a common fund" and that part 
was the amount rolled over. In August of 2002, roughly 3 months prior to the 
bankruptcy petition date, IRA funds in the amount of $20,784.19 were transferred from 
the Merrill Lynch IRA account into a Wachovia Securities IRA account. These 
transferred funds resulted in an increase to the balance of the Wachovia Securities IRA 
account in the amount of $20,784.19. Applying Merriam-Webster's definition of 
"contribute," meaning "to give a part to a common fund," there can be no doubt that 
the rolled over funds resulted in a contribution to the Wachovia Securities IRA account. 
10
 Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 47:27 
11
 State v. Hunt, 906 P.2d 311, 312 (Utah 1995). 
11 
3. The legislative intent indicates that rollovers were not specifically excluded 
from the meaning of "amounts contributed." 
In attempting to decipher the meaning of "amounts contributed" as found in 
Utah Code Annotated section 78-23-5(1 )(b)(ii) the United States Bankruptcy Court, 
District of Utah stated: "If the Utah legislature intended to differentiate between various 
types of contributions, it would have done so by express reference to their definitions 
within the Internal Revenue Code."12 The Hong court based this statement on the 
maxim, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, "is strengthened where a thing is provided 
in one part of the statute and omitted in another. "13 Applying this maxim to section 78-
23-5 the following is learned. Subsection (b) of section 78-23-5 directly references 
definitions found in the Internal Revenue Code to clarify the terms used in the 
subsection.14 The Hong court concludes that the use of the Internal Revenue Code 
reflects "the legislature's awareness and ability to make reference to definitions within 
the Internal Revenue Code."15 Conversely, the legislature fails to reference the Internal 
Revenue Code to define "contributions." The Hong court concluded that "[juxtaposed 
with subsection (b)(i), it must be presumed that the legislatures exclusion or omission 
12
 In re Hong, 2002 WL 1465737 at 5 (Bankr.D.Utah 2002). 
13
 Id. at 5 (citing Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 47:23 (6th ed.2000). 
14
 Utah Code Ann. §78-23-5(l)(b)(referring to the definitions of "alternate payee 
and "qualified domestic relations order" as defined in the Internal Revenue Code). 
15
 In re Hong, 2002 WL 1465737 at 5 (Bankr.D.Utah 2002). 
12 
of a reference to the Internal Revenue Code in subsection (b)(ii) was intentional. 
4. According to industry standards, "contribution" includes rollovers. 
As background for this section, there are only two ways for an investor to get 
money into a plan; first, money can be deposited into the account from an outside 
source. All such methods of depositing money into the account from an outside source, 
whether by the employee, employer or through a rollover from another account are 
understood in the financial industry as a contribution to that account. The only other 
way to get fiinds into a plan is through a return on the plan's principal sometimes called 
income or earnings. Keeping this return, income or earnings in the plan does not 
amount to a contribution. The Internal Revenue Code only concerns itself with 
contributions and limits how these contributions can be made. 
In defining individual retirement accounts, the Internal Revenue Code 
specifically refers to rollovers from one IRA account to another IRA account as 
"rollover contributions."17 The combination of rollover and contribution in the same 
defined term indicates that rollover is being used by legislators as an adjective, 
describing the type of contribution. A rollover contribution is a type of and included in 
16
 Id at 5. 
17
 See 26 U.S.C. 408 (stating "Except in the case of a rollover contribution 
described in subsection (d)(3), in [FN1] section 402(c), 403(a)(4), 403(b)(8), and 
457(e)(16) [FN2] no contribution will be accepted unless it is in cash, and contributions 
will not be accepted for the taxable year on behalf of any individual in excess of the 
amount in effect for such taxable year under section 219(b)(l)(A))(emphasis added). 
13 
the broad definition of contribution. Section 78-23-5(l)(b)(ii) specifically uses the term 
contribution in its broadest sense, thus including all contributions, including rollover 
contributions. At no point in section 78-23-5(l)(b)(ii) is the term "amounts 
contributed" limited. Thus, the legislature's use of "amounts contributed" should 
include "rollover contributions" barring contrary instructions from the legislature. 
Such use is consistent with the Hong Court's finding that a rollover is a contribution. 
In a separate matter between this same debtor and Trustee an issue is being 
litigated regarding the debtor's 401 (k) plan. The debtor's prototype plan also defines 
rollovers as contributions. Section 4.02 of the prototype plan states: "Any Participant. 
. . may contribute cash or other property to the Trust other than as a voluntary 
contribution if the contribution is a 'rollover contribution' which the Code permits[.]" 
Because there are only two methods of adding money to a plan, the Internal Revenue 
Code and entire financial industry define and treat rollovers as contributions. The 
widespread use of "rollover contribution" leads to the conclusion that the rollover in 
this case was a contribution as defined by federal statute and as used in the financial 
industry. The rolled over funds therefore should be included in the Utah Exemption 
Act's definition of "amounts contributed." 
5. Courts addressing this same issue have concluded that barring further 
clarification through legislation, a rollover is a contribution. 
In a line of cases from the state of Pennsylvania interpreting a Pennsylvania 
exemption statute, courts faced the task of determining whether funds rolled over from 
14 
an employer's ERISA employee benefit plan into an individual Retirement Account 
(IRA) amounted to a contribution. The applicable Pennsylvania statute at the date of 
the decision in In re Barshak, 106 F.3d 501 (3d Cir. 1997), provided: 
(b) Retirement funds and accounts. 
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), the following 
money or other property of the judgment debtor shall be 
exempt from attachment or execution on a judgment: 
(ix) Any retirement or annuity fund provided for under 
section 401(a), 403(a and (b), 408 or 409 of the internal 
Revenue Code of 1986 (public Law 99-514, 26 U.S.C. § 
401(a), 403(a and (b), 408 or 409), the appreciation thereon, 
the income and the benefits or annuity payable thereunder. 
This subparagraph shall not apply to: 
(A) Amounts contributed by the debtor to the retirement or 
annuity fund within one year before the debtor filed for 
bankruptcy. 
(B) Amounts contributed by the debtor to the retirement or 
annuity fund in excess of $15,000 within a one-year 
period.18 
The Barshak court concluded that "subsection B simply does not distinguish 
between 'rollover contributions' and 'contributions' as it places the limitation of the 
exemption on amounts 'contributed.' It would be a pure judicial construct to exclude 
'rollover contributions' from subsection B, and we will not engage in that process."19 
The year following the decision in Barshak the Pennsylvania legislature amended 
subsection (b)(l)(ix)(A) and (B) to read as follows: 
(A) Amounts contributed by the debtor to the retirement or 
annuity fund within one year before the debtor filed for 
18
 42 Pa.C.S.A. §8124(b)(l)(1997)(emphasis added). 
19
 In re Barshak, 106 F.3d 501, 504 (3rd Cir. 1997). 
15 
bankruptcy. This shall not include amounts directly rolled 
over from other funds which are exempt from attachment 
under this paragraph. 
(B) Amounts contributed by the debtor to the retirement or 
annuity fund in excess of $15,000 within a one-year period. 
This shall not include amounts directly rolled over from 
other funds which are exempt from attachment under this 
paragraph?0 
By amending the applicable statutes the Pennsylvania legislature specifically excluded 
from "amounts contributed," rolled over funds. Simply applying such a meaning 
without express instruction from the legislature is reading more into the statute than 
appears on its face. Without clarification the plain meaning of the statute controls and 
"amounts contributed" includes rolled over funds. Thus, the fact that the contribution 
in this case was a "rollover contribution" instead of any other type of contribution, 
makes no difference because the Utah Exemptions Act does not differentiate between a 
"contribution" and a "rollover contribution." 
6. Improper certification 
The United States Bankruptcy Court District of Utah previously addressed this 
exact issue in In re Hong. "Under the doctrine of stare decisis, once a point of law is 
decided, that ruling should be followed by a court of the same or a lower rank in 
subsequent cases confronting the same legal issue."21 The Supreme Court of Utah has 
20
 42 Pa.C.S.A. §8124(b)(l)(ix)(A)(as amended 1998)(emphasis added). 
2lHale v. Beckstead, All Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 74 P.3d 628, 634 (Thome dissenting, 
Utah App. 2003) 
16 
gone so far as to say: "This doctrine, under which the first decision by a court on a 
particular questicii of law governs later decisions by the same court, is a cornerstone of 
the Anglo-American jurisprudence that is crucial to the predictability of the law and the 
fairness of adjudication."22 In this case, the United States Bankruptcy Court District of 
Utah is governed by the In re Hong decision, precedent from that same court. A 
departure from the bankruptcy court's decision in Hong must be supported by "special 
justification. "23 When departing from the rule of stare decisis and overturning 
applicable precedent courts should consider numerous factors: 
1) whether the precedent is so unworkable as to be intolerable; 2) whether 
parties justifiably relied on the precedent so that reversing it would create 
an undue hardship; 3) whether the principles of law have developed to 
such an extent as to leave the old rule "no more than a remnant of 
abandoned doctrine;" and 4) whether the facts have changed in the 
interval from the old rule to reconsideration so as to have "robbed the old 
rule" of justification.24 
22State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 399 (Utah 1994)(emphasis added). 
23Arecibo Community Health Care, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 270 
F.3d 17, 22 (1st Cir. 2001)(citing Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443, 120 S.Ct. 
2326, 147 L.Ed.2d 405 (2000) (quoting United States v. IBM Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 856, 
116 S.Ct. 1793,135 L.Ed.2d 124 (1996)). 
24Padilla v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 133 N.M. 661, 68 P.3d 901,904-
05, (N.M.2003)(citing Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 125 N.M. 721, 965 P.2d 305, 
1998-NMSC-031(N.M.1998)(quotingPto«^Par^^o^ v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 
855, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992)). 
17 
The Bankruptcy Court has failed to analyze any of these factors. Instead the 
court is attempting, in a sense, to appeal the Hong decision, which decision is not 
before this court. The Bankruptcy Court should be bound by stare decisis, barring 
"special justification," which the Bankruptcy Court has not produced. The Bankruptcy 
Court is basically asking for an advisory opinion from the Utah Supreme Court on a 
matter that it has already decided and which it is bound to follow excluding "special 
justification." 
Thus, given the decision in Hong and the adoption of Hong by the certifying 
court in In re Linda Marie Mount there is no uncertainty of law as required by Rule 41 
to certify a question to this Court. The status of this particular question as it related to 
the Bankruptcy Court was certain. The Bankruptcy Court held in Hong that "'amounts 
contributed' under Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5-(l)(b)(ii) includes, but is not limited to, 
those amounts rolled over from ERISA-qualified plans to an IRA Annuity." The 
bankruptcy court again adopted Hong in In re Mount. These cases directly control the 
bankruptcy court via stare decisis, as the only controlling law for the bankruptcy court 
and should therefore have been followed without certification to this Court. The First 
Circuit has outlined two circumstances where departure from the doctrine of stare 
decisis is warranted: "The first arises when '[a]n existing panel decision may be 
undermined by controlling authority, subsequently announced, such as an opinion of the 
Supreme Court, an en banc opinion, or a statutory overruling.' In the second 
circumstance, '[w]hen emergent Supreme Court case law calls into question a prior 
18 
opinion of another court, that court should pause to consider its likely significance 
before giving effect to an earlier decision/"25 Neither of these circumstances is present 
in this case. Thus, stare decisis controls, there is no uncertain state of Utah law and 
this certified question is moot. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the plain meaning of the "amounts contributed," the existing caselaw 
from other jurisdictions, industry standards and United States statutes all treat a 
rollover as a contribution, the certified question should be answered similarly. Thus, 
the Trustee, Stephen W. Rupp respectfully asks this court to include the debtor's 
rollover as an "amount contributed" as such term is used in UCA 78-23-5(b)(ii). 
Dated this tfl day of October, 2003. 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
Stephen W. Ri 
Attorneys fori 
25Arecibo Community Health Care, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 270 
F.3d 17,23 (1st Cir. 2001)(citing Williams v. Ashland Eng'g Co., 45 F.3d 588, 592 (1st 
Cir.1995) and Carpenters Local Union No. 26 v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 215 F.3d 
136, 141 (1st Cir.2000)). 
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IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
In re: 
TAE SUN HONG and BOK R. HONG, 
Debtors. 
Bankruptcy Number: O1-JAB35072 
Chapter 7 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER SUSTAINING 
OBJECTION TO CLAIMED EXEMPTION 
Pending before the court is the Chapter 7 Trustee's Objection To Claimed Exemptions 
(Trustee's Objection). The Trustee's Objection necessitates a determination of two underlying 
issues: First, whether an IRA estabhshed and funded prepetition from funds rolled over from an 
ERISA-qualified plan is exempt from the estate under 11 U.S.C § 541(c)(2);1 and second, if the 
IRA is property of the estate, whether the property is exempt under Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-23-
5(l)(a)(x) or 78-23-6. 
The Chapter 7 Trustee (Trustee) asserts that the funds are property of the estate under 
§ 541(c), and objects to Tae Sun Hong and Bole R. Hong, the chapter 7 debtors herein (Debtors), 
All future references arc to Title 11 of the United States Code unlcis otherwise noted. 
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claiming the funds in the individual Retirement Account invested in an annuity (IRA Annuity) as 
exempt pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5(l)(a)(x), The Trustee maintains that the funds in 
the IRA Annuity are not exempt pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5(l)(b)(ii)> In response, 
Debtors argue that the funds in the IRA Annuity are not property of the estate. Debtors assert 
that because the JR A Annuity was created by a rollover from a plan qualified under the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (88 Stat. 829, as amended, 29 U.S.C § 1001 et 
^.(ERISA-qualified), to which 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) would apply, the IRA Annuity also is 
protected. Alternatively, Debtors argue that the funds in die IRA Annuity are exempt under Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 78-23-5(l)(a)(x) or 78-23-6. 
After due consideration ot the stipulated or otherwise undisputed facts, the parties' briefs 
and arguments, and following an independent review of the applicable caselaw, the Court 
concludes that the funds in the IRA Annuity are property of the estate and that neither Utah Code 
Ann §§ 78-23-5(1 )(a)(x) nor 78-23-6 exempt the funds from execution. The basis for the 
decision is set forth below. 
FACTS 
Debtor Bok Hong established the IRA Annuity on January 22, 2001. The IRA was 
established by the Debtor with funds rolled over from an ERISA-qualified 401 (k) account, and is in 
the form of an annuity. The only deposits made into the IRA Annuity were: (1) January 22, 2001 
in the amount of $47,090.70, and, (2) Fcbmary 23, 2001 in the amount of $34,866.24. The only 
withdrawals made from the IRA Annuity were: (1) February 28, 2001 in the amount of $3,333.34, 
and; (2) September 25,2001 in the amount of 53,333.34. The balance of funds in the IRA Annuity 
as of September 30, 2001 was $78,102.47. 
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On October 11,2001, Debtors filed their Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. Debtors claimed 
their interest in the ERA Annuity exempt pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5(1 )(a)(x) on Schedule 
C, filed the same date as the petition. The IRA Annuity was listed on Debtors* Schedule B as 
personal property valued at $77,683. According to Schedule I, also filed October 11,2001 > Debtors 
are not receiving distributions from the IRA Annuity. Debtors did not amend Schedule I. The 
Trustee timely filed the Trustee's Objection on December 12,2001. On April 9,2002, Debtors filed 
an Amended Schedule C to reflect that they no longer claimed the funds in the IRA Annuity as 
exempt property. The IRA Annuity is listed on Amended Schedule B as personal property, with the 
caveat that the IRA Annuity is '4(n]ot property of the estate pursuant to Section 541(c)(2) of the 
Bankruptcy Code."2 The ERA Annuity remains valued at $77,683 on Amended Schedule B. No 
documents were presented at the hearing reflecting the creation of or terms of the IRA Annuity (IRA 
Annuity documents). Debtors concede that the IRA Annuity documents do not contain anti-
alienation language. 
DECISION 
Jurisdiction and Burden of Proof 
This matter is core <is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A) and (O). Therefore, pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b) and 1334, andDUCivR 83-7.1(a), which automatically refers bankruptcy cases 
and proceedings to this Court for hearing and determination, this Court can enter the order set forth 
2
 Because the Debtors amended their schedules to assert the funds in the ERA 
Annuity are not property of the estate after the Trustee's Objection was filed, the only matter 
actually pending before the court is the Trustee's Objection. However, at oral argument the 
parties agreed that the court should first decide the Debtors' argument that the funds in the IRA 
Annuity are not property of the estate, and, if the funds are determined to be property of the 
estate, the Debtors would also make their argument that the IRA Annuity is exempt under state 
law. 
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herein. 
A party objecting to a claimed exemption has the burden of proving that the subject property 
is not exempt. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4003(c); In re Doyle, 209 B.R. 897 (Bankr. N.D. III 1997). 
However, once the objecting party has made out a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the debtor 
to prove that such property is excluded from the bankruptcy estate. Altura Partnership v. Breninc, 
Inc., (In re B.I. Financial Services Groups., Inc.) 854 F.2d 351,354 (9th Cir. 1988)(the proponent 
of the argument that property is held in trust and is therefore not property of the estate has the burden 
of establishing the original trust relationship). 
11U.S.C8 541. 
Section 541(a)(1) provides that all 'legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property" 
become property of the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). Therefore, it is first necessary to determine 
if the funds in the IRA Annuity are property of the estate before evaluating whether they may be 
exempt under Utah law. See Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305, 308 (l99l)("No property can be 
exempted (and thereby immunized), however* unless if first falls within the bankruptcy estate/*). 
Debtors initially argue that the Supreme Court's decision in Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 
753 (1992), should lead this Court to conclude that an IRA is not property of the estate. In 
Patterson, the court concluded that a debtor's interest in an ERISA-qualified retirement plan is 
excluded from property of the bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S-C § 541(c)(2). Carbaugh v. 
Carbaugh (In re Carbaugh), BAP No. KS-01-029, 2002 WL 825171, *3 (10th Cir. BAP May I, 
2002)(citing Orr v. Yuhas (In re Yulw\j. 104 F.3d 612, 614 (3d Cir. 1997))(Under Patterson, 
debtor's interest in ERISA-qualifed plan is completely excluded from bankruptcy estate). 
Section 541(c)(2) provides: 
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A restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of thadebtor in a trust that is 
enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law is enforceable in a case under this 
title. 
11 U.S.C.S 541(c)(2). 
Recognizing that the beneficial interest must be contained in a trust, it is necessary to 
determine whether the IRA Annuity in this case satisfies that requirement. For the purposes of this 
discussion, annuities are generally categorized as either fixed or variable. If the annuity is fixed, it 
"cannot constitute [a] trust[] within the meaning of § 541(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code unless the 
annuity and endowment contracts that form the basis for said annuities constitute trusts under 
relevant state law." Pineo v. Fulton (In re Fulton), 240 B.R. 854,866-67 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1999). 
In this case, because the IRA Annuity documents are not in evidence, it is impossible to determine 
if annuity and endowment contracts exist to form the basis for a trust. However, to the extent the 
IRA Annuitymay be fixed, this Court is persuaded by the exhaustive analysis set forth mFulton, 240 
B.R. at 866 n.14 and particular attention should be paid thereto. 
If the IRA Annuity is variable, then § 541(c)(2) does not apply inasmuch as the IRA was 
funded by a prepetition rollover from an ERISA-qualified plan. Instructive on this issue is In re 
Ekanger, 1999 WL 671866, *2 (Bankr. E.D. Va. May 17,1999), wherein the court stated: 
ERISA contains no language imposing an anti-alienation requirement on funds 
withdrawn from a qualified plan or rolled-over to a tax-qualified IRA. It is solely 
because of the anti-alienation requirement that the debtor's interest in an ERISA-
qualified plan does not come into the bankruptcy estate: essentially, the ERISA plan 
is treated like a spendthrift trust. IRA's, by contrast, are not subject to any legal 
restriction on alienation or anticipation. An IRA is simply a creature of the Internal 
Revenue Code designed to encourage taxpayers to save for retirement. That an 
assignment or premature withdrawal of the funds in such an account might have 
adverse tax consequences does not, in and of itself, constitute a Restriction on the 
transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor in a trust" such as to result in the 
exclusion of the funds from the debtor's bankruptcy estate. Accordingly, an IRA -
IALAW\QPlNlONS\Opin363.wpd 
Page 5 of 15 
June 4,2002 
even one funded by roll-over from an ERIS A-quahfied pension plan - is property of 
the bankruptcy estate. 
In re Ekcmger, 1999 WL 671866, *2 (Bankr. E.D. Va. May 17,1999); accord. Eisenberg v. Houck 
(In re Houck), 181 B.R. 187 (Bankr. E.D. Pa, 1995). 
Debtors concede that the ERA Annuity is not ERISA-qualified and, as a result, there is no 
federal anti-alienation restriction. They also conceded that there is no anti-alienation language in 
the underlying documents of the IRA Annuity. Debtors contend, however, that there is state law that 
restricts the transfer of the beneficial interest. Stated differently* Debtors appear to argue that at the 
moment the funds leave the ERISA-qualified restriction they are somehow protected by similar 
restrictions provided for under state law, namely Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5. 
Rather than relying on ihe language ot Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5 for the purpose of claiming 
an exemption, Debtors urge this Court to look to Che policy of the exemption statute and conclude 
that for the purposes of § 541(c)(2), the spirit of the state statute satisfies the definition of 
"applicable nonbankruptcy law." This assertion is not persuasive for two reasons. First, Debtors 
seek to use an exemption statute to argue that the funds in the IRA Annuity are not property of the 
estate. This expansion of both ERISA and § 541(c)(2) is improper. Carbaugh, 2002 WL 825171, 
*4 (uncommingled monies distributed from pension plans and placed in accounts not under the 
auspices of ERISA do not remain protected by it, citing Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l 
Pension Funds., 39 R3d 1078,1081-82 (10* Cir. 1994). Second, Debtors reliance onln reMeehan, 
102 F.3d 1209 (11th Cir. 1997) is tenuous, as the analysis in Meehan is generally criticized as 
misinterpreting the Supreme Court's decision in Patterson. In Meehan it was held that the restriction 
need not be contained m the IRA Annuity document because a Georgia statute contained a similar 
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restriction. However, as set forth in In re Lowenschuss, 171 FJd 673,683-684 (9th Cif. 1999), the 
analysis in Meehan is flawed. The court in Lowenschnss stated as follows: "We believe that the 
Supreme Court's statement in Patterson limited 11 U.S.C. 541(c)(2) to its "natural reading" - a 
debtor's interest in a trust may be excluded from the bankruptcy estate only if the trust contains a 
transfer restriction, and that restriction is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law." 
Lowenschuss, 171 F.3d at 683(citing Patterson, 504 U.S. at 758). Contrary to Meehan, the Supreme 
Court was clarifying that § 541 refers to "applicable nonbankruptcy law," not exclusively to state 
law. As stated in In re Zott, 225 B.R. 160,165 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1998): 
To accept the premise espoused in Meehan* that a transfer restriction within a state 
statute is sufficient to meet the requirements of § 541(c)(2), would render the 
language 'enforceable under nonbankruptcy law' nugatory and meaningless 
surplusage because a state statute (nonbankruptcy law) is obviously enforceable 
under state law (nonbankruptcy law). 
ZotU 225 B.R. at 165(cited with approval in Lowenschuss, 171 R3d at 683). 
Furthermore, Lowenschuss recognized that the trust instrument must contain the restriction, 
and the applicable nonbankruptcy law merely provides a means to enforce that restriction: 
Only if the transfer restriction contained in the trust instrument is enforceable under 
applicable nonbankruptcy law can the debtor's beneficial interest in that trust be 
excluded from the bankruptcy estate. Because a debtor must be able to enforce the 
transfer restriction contained in a trust instrument under applicable nonbankruptcy 
law, and because [the state statute] does not provide a means to enforce a transfer 
restriction contained in a trust, (the state statute] cannot operate to exclude from the 
bankruptcy estate Debtor's interest in the (non ERISA-quaiified plan]. 
Lowenschuss, 171 F.3d al 684-85. 
Because it is impossible to determine whether the IRA Annuity contains the requisite 
restriction absent the ERA Annuity documents, the funds therein are property of th? estate. As a 
result, it is necessary to address the state exemption statutes set forth below. 
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Utah Code Ann. 3 78-23-5(1)(aKx) 
Alternati vely, Debtors argue that should the funds in the IRA Annuity be included in property 
of the estate, they are exempt under Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5(l)(a)(x), which exempts property 
held for or payable to an individual that is described in various sections of the Internal Revenue 
Code; 
(x) except as provided in Subsection (l)(b), any money or other assets held for or 
payable to the individual as a participant or beneficiary from or an interest of the 
individual as a participant or beneficiary in a retirement plan or arrangement that is 
described in Section 401(a), 401(h), 401(k), 403(a), 403(b), 408,408A, 409,414(d), 
or 414(e) of the United States Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended;... 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5(l)(a)(x). 
Since the funds in the IRA Annuity fall within Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5(l)(a)(x) because 
they are held in an arrangement that is described in Section 408 of the Internal Revenue Code, they 
are exempt from execution, unless another provision of the Utah exemption statute allows execution. 
The Trustee argues that Utah Code Ann.§ 78-23-5(1 )(b)(ii), which excludes from the exemption 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5(l)(a)0O, any contribution made to an IRA within one year of filing 
for bankruptcy, is precisely such a provision. 
It is undisputed that Debtors established the IRA Annuity with funds rolled over from an 
ERISA-qualified 401(k) account on January 22,2001, approximately ten months before the October 
11, 2001 petition date. Therefore, one criteria under Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5(l)(b)(ii) is met. 
However, the question remains whether rolling over funds from an ERISA-qualified plan to an IRA 
Annuity constitutes a "contribution" for the purposes of Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5(1 )(b)(ii). The 
term "contribution" is not defined in the statute. The Debtors argue that "contribution" should be 
restricted to additional funds placed in the IRA Annuity after its creation; that no "new" funds were 
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placed in the IRA Annuity, only a transfer in the form of existing funds from the ERIS A-qualified 
plan to the IRA Annuity. Therefore, the Debtors assert that no funds were "contributed'* to the IRA 
within a year of filing. The Trustee, on the other hand^ asserts that the statute contains no restriction 
on the term "contribution," and if the State legislature has wished to exclude rollover contributions 
from § 78-23-5(l)(b)(ii), it would have done so. The Trustee's argument that the Debtors* rollover 
of funds to the IRA Annuity is a "contribution" is more persuasive. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5(l)(b) sets forth two exclusions from the exemption provided for 
in Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5(1 )(a)(x): 
(b) the exemption granted by Subsection (l)(a)(x) does not apply to: 
(i) an alternate payee under a qualified domestic relations order, as 
those terms are defined in Section 414(p) of the United States Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986, as amended; or 
(ii) amounts contributed or benefits accrued by or on behalf of a 
debtor within one year before the debtor files for bankruptcy. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5-(l)(b). 
Subsection (b) of Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5(1) expressly references the Internal Revenue 
Code definition of an alternate payee under a qualified domestic relations order, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-23-5(1 )(b)(i), thus reflecting the legislature's awareness and ability to make reference to 
definitions within the Internal Revenue Code. Subsection (b)(ii), however, makes no reference to 
any definitions in the Internal Revenue Code, which uses "contribution" in a variety of circumstances 
to describe dollar limitations on new funds placed yearly into an IRA, and has extensive regulations 
on rolling over ERISA qualified funds into various other tax advantaged accounts. Juxtaposed with 
.subsection (b)(i), it must be presumed that the legislatures exclusion or omission of a reference to 
the Internal Revenue Code was intentional See SINGER, STATUTES A N D STATUTORY 
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CONSTRUCTION § 47:23 (6th ed, 2000)(stating that the maxim, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, 
"is strengthened where a thing is .provided in one part of the statute and omitted in another."). 
Although this conclusion can be overcome by a strong indication of contrary legislative intent or 
policy, the present statute is silent on those considerations and no legislative history exists from 
which to make an inference. Id. If the Utah legislature intended to differentiate between various 
types of contributions, it would have done so by express reference to their definitions within the 
Internal Revenue Code. See e.g. 26 U.S.C. § 408(d)(3)(dcfining "Rollover contribution"); SiNGER, 
at § 47:27 ("[W]hen the statutory term is undefined, that term must be given its ordinary and 
popularly understood meaning. There is a presumption that the legislature intended to use the actual 
words it utilizes in the statute, which in turn . . . are intended to be utilized in the ordinary and 
common meanings.")(intemal citations omitted). Therefore, "amounts contributed" under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-23-5-(l)(b)(ii) includes, but is not limited to, those amounts roiled over from 
ERISA-quaiified plans lo an IRA Annuity. 
A similar situation presented itself in the interpretation of a Pennsylvania exemption statute 
in In re Barshak, 106 F.3d 501 (3d Cir. 1997), wherein the court was faced with determining if a 
rollover of funds from an ERISA-quahfied plan to an IRA was a contribution. The significance of 
the decision was that if it was deemed a contribution, the debtor would only be permitted to exempt 
the contribution up to $ 15,000. The Pennsylvania statute in effect at the date of the debtor's petition, 
and at the date of the decision in Barshak, provided in pertinent part: 
(b) Retirement funds and accounts. -
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), the following money or other property of the 
judgment debtor shall be exempt from attachment or execution on a judgment: 
(ix) Any retirement or annuity fund provided for under section 401 (a), 403(a) and (b), 
408 or 409 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (Public Law 99-514,26 U.S.C. § 
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401(a), 403(a) and (b), 408 or 409), the appreciation thereon, the income and the 
benefits or annuity payable thereunder. This subparagraph shall not apply to: 
(A) Amounts contributed by the debtor to the retirement or annuity fund within one 
year before the debtor filed for bankruptcy. 
(B) Amounts contributed by the debtor to the retirement or annuity fund in excess of $15,000 
within a one-year period. 
42Pa.C.S.A. § 8124(b)(l)(1997). 
Based on a plain reading of subsection (B), the Barshak court stated that "subsection B 
simply does not distinguish between 'rollover contributions' and 'contributions' as it places the 
limitation of the exemption on amounts 'contributed.' It would be a pure judicial construct to 
exclude ftrollover contributions* from subsection B, and we will not engage in that process/' 
Barsltak, 106 R3d at 504. The court also acknowledged and refused to address the policy argument 
that the statute was enacted to exempt retirement funds, in general, from attachment and execution, 
and stated: 
But even if this policy argument were well-founded, a point on which we express no 
opinion, the plain language of subsection B compels us to reach our result. We are 
not free to ignore the clear language of a Pennsylvania statute merely because by 
rewriting the statute we arguably would act consistently with a legislative policy. In 
the end, the case comes down to this: we rule on the basis of what the law is rather 
than what a party wishes it could be. 
Id. at 506 (internal citation omitted). 
In 1998, the Pennsylvania legislature amended subsection (b)(l)(ix), most notably 
subsections (A) and (B), to read as follows: 
(A) Amounts contributed by the debtor to the retirement or annuity fund within one 
year before the debtor filed for bankruptcy. This shall not include amounts directly 
rolled over from other funds which are exempt from attachment under this 
paragraph 
(B) Amounts contributed by the debtor to the retirement or annuity fund in excess of 
$ 15,000 within a one-year period. This sliall not include amounts directly rolled over 
jrom other funds which are exempt from attachment under this paragraph. 
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42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8124(b)(l)(ix)(A)(as amended 1998)(emphasis added).3 
In so doing the Pennsylvania legislature exercised its authority and amended the statute to 
expressly exclude those amounts contributed as a result of a rollover. The instant matter is no 
different, and absent reference in the statute to the contrary, this Coun will not deviate from the 
statute's plain meaning and attempt to parse-out the various types of contributions defined in the 
Internal Revenue Code, If the Utah legislature wishes to amend Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5(1 )(b)(ii) 
to exclude amounts contributed by the rollover of funds into an exempt plan, it has the authority to 
do so. Therefore, having established that the IRA Annuity was funded by Debtors via a contribution 
within one year of the petition date, Debtors may not claim an exemption pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann.§78-23-5(l)(a)(x). 
Utah Code Ann. 8 78-23-6 
Debtors also argue that the property is exempt under Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-6 which 
Ihe applicable section of 42 Pa C.S.A. § 8124(b) as amended in 1998 reads in its entirety as 
follows: 
(b) Retirement funds and accounts. -
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), the following money or other property of the judgment 
debtor shall be exempt from attachment or execution on a judgment: 
(ix) Any retirement or annuity fund provided for under section 401(a), 403(a)and (b), 408,408A, 
409 or 510 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (Public law 99-514, 26 U S.C. § 401(a). 403(a) 
and (bK 408, 408A, 409 or 530), the appreciation thereon, the income therefrom, the benefits or 
annuity payable thereunder and transfers and rollovers between such funds. This subparagraph 
shall not apply to: 
(A) Amounts contributed by the debtor to the retirement or annuity fund within one year before the 
debtor filed for bankruptcy. This shall not include amounts directly rolled over from other funds 
which are exempt from attachment under this paragraph. 
(B) Amounts contributed by the debtor to the retirement or annuity fund in excess of 
$15,000 within a one-year period. This shall not include amounts directly rolled over 
from other funds which are exempt from attachment under this paragraph. 
(C) Amounts deemed to be fraudulent conveyances. 
42 Pa C S A. § 8124fl>)< Ofix)(A)(as amended 1998) 
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provides, in relevant part: 
[A]n individual is entitled to exemption of the following property to the extent 
reasonably necessary for the support of the individual and his dependants: 
(3) assets held, payments, and amounts payable under a stock bonus, pension, profit-
sharing, annuity, or similar plan providing benefits other than by reason of illness or 
disability 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-6. 
The court in In re Swensen, 130 B.R, 99 (Bankr. D. Utah 1991), determined that IRAs are 
not exempt because they fail to fall within the parameters of "annuity or other similar plan," 
Debtors, however, argue that Swensen is inapplicable here on two grounds: first, because the statute 
expressly recognizes an "annuity/' which exists in some form in this case as stipulated to by the 
parties, and; second, that from a policy standpoint an IRA should be treated in a fashion similar to 
other ERIS A-qualified plans. Neither argument is persuasive under the plain language of the statute* 
In order to accept Debtors first proposition, that an annuity is exempt to the extent it satisfies 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-6(3), it is necessary to ignore the first statement of the exemption statute 
which allows a person to exempt property "reasonably necessary for the support of the individual 
and his dependants." Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-6. In this case, Debtors have not claimed that the 
IRA Annuity is reasonably necessary for their support. Despite two withdrawals, Debtors did not 
list any regular distribution from funds in the IRA Annuity on their Schedule I - Current Income of 
Individual Debtors. Debtors also have not alleged that the two prepetition withdrawals were 
necessary for their support. Rather, Debtors argue that this Court should look forward and speculate 
as to their need for regular distributions in the future. This argument, however, is without merit 
inasmuch as it is expected that everyone will, one day, require regular distributions from their 
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retirement savings. To conclude otherwise would render the language in the first paragraph of Utah 
Code Ann § 78-23-6 superfluousand without meaning. 
With respect to Debtors argument that an IRA Annuity should be treated in a fashion similar 
to other ERISA-qualified plans as a matter of policy, this Court declines to enter into a legislative 
role. Had Congress intended to equip IRA's with anti-alienation lunguage, it could have done so. 
Debtors arc not entitled to the benefit of an exemption claimed under Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-6. 
Accordingly, it is hereby 
ORDERED, that the Debtors' interest in the IRA Annuity is property of the estate; and it is 
further 
ORDERED, that the Trustee's Objection To Claimed Exemptions is SUSTAINED to the 
extent Debtors claim an exemption pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-6, and that exemption is 
DENIED; and it is further 
ORDERED, that the Trustee's Objection To Claimed Exemptions is SUSTAINED to the 
extent Debtors claim an exemption pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5(1 )(a)(x), that exemption 
is DENIED. 
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pooOooo, 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, the undersigned, do hereby certify that I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER SUSTAINING OBJECTION TO CLAIMED 
EXEMPTION upon the following by mailing the same, postage prepaid, on the <*L day of June, 
2002, to: 
Carolyn Montgomery, Esq. 
3285 Oakcliff Drive 
Sail Lake City, UT 84124 
Attorney for Debtors 
David R, Williams, Esq. 
Woodbury & Kesler 
265 East 100 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110 
Attorney for Chapter 7 Trustee 
Deputy Clerk 
United States Bankruptcy Court 
l:\LAW\OP»NlONS\Opin363.wpd 
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June 4,2002 
IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
In re 
LINDA MARIE MOUNT, 
Debtor. 
Bankruptcy Case No. 02C-29694 
Chapter 7 
ORDER SUSTAINING TRUSTEE'S 
OBJECTION TO CLAIM OF 
EXEMPTION 
This matter came before the Court on the 4th day of September, 2002. Joel T. Marker, the 
Chapter 7 Trustee (the 'Trustee") in this case, appeared in behalf of himself, and James C 
Haskins appeared in behalf of Linda Marie Mount (the 'Debtor")' 
On August 28, 2001, the Debtor rolled her 401 (K) plan into an ERA plan. The total 
amount of funds rolled over into die IRA was $10,708.10. On June 12, 2002, less than one year 
later, the Debtor filed her bankruptcy petition under Chapter 7 and claimed the IRA fluids exempt 
under U,C A. § 78-23-5(l)(a)(xX The Trustee objects to Debtor's claimed exemption arguing 
that, because the IRA was established within one year of the Debtor's petition date, tlie IRA is 
not exempt because U.CA. § 78-23-5(l)(b)(ii) provides diat, with respect to pension funds, 
amounts contributed or benefits accrued by or on behalf of a debtor within one year of 
bankruptcy are not exempt. In support of his objection, the Trustee cites to In re Tae Sun Hong 
no*>aRQAnift 
and Bok R. Hong, case No. 01-35072 JAB (Bankr. D. Ut June 4,2002), for the proposition that 
funds rolled over from an ERISA qualified plan into an IRA are a "contribution" within the 
meaning of U.CA. § 78-23-5(1 )(b)(ii) and therefore not exempt if rolled over within one year of 
the petitbn date. The Debtor argues that Tae Sun Hong is wrongly decided, that a rollover is not 
a "contribution" because no "new" funds are placed into a pension as a result of a rollover and 
that the Court should mierprtt exemption statutes liberally in favor of debtors and therefore allow 
the exemption. 
After considering the pleadings and argument of counsel and after thoroughly reviewing 
the law with respect to this controversy, it is die opinion of this Court that Tae Sun Hong 
correctly interprets the effect of U.CA. § 78-23-5(1 )(b)(ii) on Debtor's claimed exemption under 
78-23-5(1 )(a)(x). Therefore, it is hereby 
ORDERED that the Trustee's objection to Debtor's claimed exemption under U.C A. 
§ 78-23-5(1 )(a)(x) is sustained, and it is further 
ORDERED that the Court, in so ruling, makes no determination as to the amount which 
the Debtor may claim as exempt pursuant to U.CA. § 78-23-6(3); see In re Kerr. 65 B.R. 739 
(Bankr. D. Utah 1986); In re Savage. 248 B.R. 573 (Bankr. D. Ark. 2000). 
DATED this J ^ / day of September, 2002. 
BY THE COURT: 
GLEN B. CLARK, CHIEF JUDGE 
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify thiU on the _ ^ Z - d a y of September, 2002,1 mailed a tme and accurate copy of 
the foregoing ORDER to the following by depositing the same ia the United States mail, postage 
prepaid, addressed as follows: 
JAMES CHASKINS 
HASKINS & ASSOCIATES 
357 SOUTH 200 EAST 
SUITE 300 
SALTLAKBCTTY UT 84111 
JOELTMARKER 
10 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE 
surra 600 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84133 
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